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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs seeking to challenge government surveillance programs 
have faced long odds in federal courts, due mainly to a line of Su-
preme Court cases that have set a very high bar to Article III standing 
in these cases.1  The origins of this jurisprudence can be directly 
 
 ∗  University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Thanks to Ryan Calo, Danielle Citron, Woody 
Hartzog, Orin Kerr, Seth Kreimer, Brett Max Kaufman, Rita Siemon, and Ben Wizner for 
their comments on earlier drafts. 
 1 The “case or controversy” requirement of Article III standing doctrine has developed to 
require that plaintiffs demonstrate “injury in fact” that is “certainly impending,” a difficult 
task for those seeking to challenge government programs whose secrecy often prohibits 
access to supporting evidence.  See, e.g., Alan Butler, Standing Up to Clapper:  How to In-
crease Transparency and Oversight of FISA Surveillance, 48 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 55, 69–70 
(2013); Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”:  John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, 
and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 53 (1985); Heather Elliott, 
The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 461 (2008); William A. Fletcher, The Struc-
ture of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988); Gene R. Nichol Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 
CAL. L. REV. 68, 102 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, 
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168 (1992); Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing 
and Secret Surveillance, 10 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO SOC’Y 551, 552 (2014). 
   While it is beyond the scope of this Essay, it is worth noting here that standing doc-
trine has long been a favorite topic of argument within law review articles.  For a list, see 
Nichol, supra, at 68 n.3.  Black letter standing doctrine—to the extent there is such a 
thing—begins with the basic rule that a plaintiff may only have standing before a federal 
court if she has satisfied the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III, by showing 
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traced to Laird v. Tatum, a 1972 case where the Supreme Court con-
sidered the question of who could sue the government over a surveil-
lance program, holding in a 5-4 decision that chilling effects arising 
“merely from the individual’s knowledge” of likely government sur-
veillance did not constitute adequate injury to meet Article III stand-
ing requirements.2  Federal courts have since relied—and built—
upon Laird to deny standing to plaintiffs in surveillance cases, includ-
ing the 2013 Supreme Court decision in Clapper v. Amnesty Interna-
tional USA.3  But the facts behind Laird illuminate a number of im-
portant reasons why it is a weak basis for surveillance standing 
doctrine.  It is therefore a worthwhile endeavor, I think, to reexamine 
Laird in a post-Snowden context in order to gain a deeper under-
standing of the Court’s standing doctrine in surveillance cases. 
I.  ARMY SURVEILLANCE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS 
The facts behind Laird originated with a January 1970 article in 
The Washington Monthly, titled CONUS Intelligence:  The Army Watches 
Civilian Politics.4  The article was written by Christopher Pyle, a lawyer 
and former Army military intelligence officer, who revealed that 
 
that she has suffered an “injury in fact,” that her injury has been caused by the conduct 
found in the complaint, and that her injury is redressable by the court.  See, e.g., Massa-
chusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (“Congress has the power to define injuries and 
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy. . . . In exercising 
this power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindi-
cate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.” (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 
(1992) (“[T]he party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete 
and personal way. . . . [This requirement] preserves the vitality of the adversarial process 
by assuring both that the parties before the court have an actual . . . stake in the outcome, 
and that ‘the legal questions . . . presented will be resolved. . . .’”); Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) 
(noting the difference between actual injury redressable by the court, which tends to be a 
legal question presented to the court, and standing, which “assures an actual factual set-
ting in which the litigant asserts a claim of injury in fact”). 
 2 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972). 
 3 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (denying standing on the 
theory that injuries due to surveillance were “too speculative”); Hein v. Freedom From 
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (denying standing in a taxpayer lawsuit); 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974) (denying 
standing where the lawsuit was based on complaints held in common with all members of 
public).  But see United States v. United States Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 
297, 299, 323–34, 326 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (acknowledging Laird yet concur-
ring that judicial approval was required prior to the initiation of government domestic 
searches or surveillance, in accordance with applicable U.S. law). 
 4 Christopher H. Pyle, CONUS Intelligence:  The Army Watches Civilian Politics, WASH. 
MONTHLY, Jan. 1970. 
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“[t]he U.S. Army has been closely watching civilian political activity 
within the United States.  Nearly 1,000 plainclothes [Army] investiga-
tors . . . keep track of political protests of all kinds—from Klan rallies 
in North Carolina to anti-war speeches at Harvard.”5  Further, Pyle 
claimed that the Army kept “files on the membership, ideology, pro-
grams, and practices of virtually every activist political group in the 
country.”6  Army officials initially denied Pyle’s claims, but Congress, 
the press, and the public were becoming increasingly unimpressed 
with the integrity of military leadership at that time, especially after 
the November 1969 revelations of the My Lai Massacre and the sub-
sequent attempted cover-up by U.S. officials.7  The article sparked in-
quiries from dozens of senators and congressmen, and the Army’s 
general counsel responded by asserting that he had ordered the Ar-
my Intelligence Command at Fort Holabird, Maryland to destroy its 
civilian surveillance databases.8  He failed to mention, however, that 
the Army continued to maintain volumes of “Counterintelligence” in-
formation on paper, microfilm, and regional databanks on “Organi-
zations of Interest and Individuals of Interest,” which included details 
on thousands of organizations and individuals, from the John Birch 
Society, to the Urban League, to Martin Luther King, Jr.9 
It is no surprise that these revelations elicited a strong response 
from Americans.  Since the founding, U.S. citizens have been ambiva-
lent when it comes to a standing military, with the Third Amendment 
being a tangible recognition of this philosophy.10  The nation’s 
 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id.; see also SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVILIAN 
POLITICS, S. REP. NO. 87-312, at 4–5 (1973) (discussing the history of military surveil-
lance). 
 7 By the end of the 1960s, the U.S. government was losing what little support they once had 
among the American people for the interminable war in Vietnam.  This growing anti-
military and anti-government sentiment exploded when the news of the My Lai Massa-
cre—and the Army’s initial attempts to cover it up—became publicly known.  See generally 
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE MY LAI MASSACRE AND ITS COVER-UP:  BEYOND THE REACH 
OF LAW? 29 (1976) (discussing the May Lai Massacre and the Army’s attempt to cover it 
up); WILLIAM R. PEERS, THE MY LAI INQUIRY 3, 5, 9 (1979) (same). 
 8 At the time of Pyle’s article, Congress was beginning to take an early interest in the issue 
of government computer databases, with inquiries into security clearances for scientific 
personnel as well as the growing number of Secret Service databases.  Pyle’s article gave 
Senator Sam Ervin, then chairman of the Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, the 
fodder to move forward with hearings.  Christopher H. Pyle, CONUS Revisited:  The Army 
Covers Up, THE WASH. MONTHLY, July 1970, at 49–58. 
 9 Id.; see also SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVILIAN 
POLITICS, S. REP. NO. 87-312, at 4–5 (1973); Clay Risen, Spies Among Us, 78 AM. SCHOLAR 
49, 49–51, 60 (2008).  
 10 See JOAN M. JENSEN, ARMY SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA, 1775–1980, at 72–75 (1991) (“The 
ambivalence of the War Department about its first officer spy hero before World War I re-
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Founders were not naïve, however, and allowed for the provision, 
under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, of statutory procedures 
for the use of the military to restore public order.11  These proce-
dures, however, were constrained to three possible uses:  (1) the Pres-
ident may use federal forces upon a request by a state legislature to 
restore civil order, (2) the President may deploy federal forces to 
combat a rebellion against the federal government, and (3) the Pres-
ident may use federal forces if a state denies constitutional rights to a 
part of that state’s population.12  There is no such provision for the 
use of federal troops to surveil U.S. citizens prior to any legal com-
mitment by the President.  Congress further strengthened this sepa-
ration when it passed the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which forbade 
the use of military forces in law enforcement, except when expressly 
authorized by Congress.13  It should be noted, however, that, begin-
ning with the Reagan Administration, the increasing use of federal 
military forces in the war on drugs has weakened this barrier.14 
II.  LAIRD V. TATUM AND THE QUESTION OF STANDING 
North Carolina Senator Samuel Ervin, Jr., chairman of the Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, held extensive inquiries regarding Pyle’s allegations in 
1971, placing a large body of testimony and documentation regard-
ing Army surveillance into the public record.15  A number of organi-
 
flected the ambivalence of the American government and people.”); William S. Fields & 
David T. Hardy, The Third Amendment and the Issue of the Maintenance of Standing Armies:  A 
Legal History, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 393, 431 (1991). 
 11 See Robert Reinders, Militia and Public Order in Nineteenth-Century America, 11 J. AM. 
STUDIES 81, 83 (1977) (stating that Article I, Section 8, paragraphs 15–16 reflected a 
compromise among the Framers which allows for a national role in public security). 
 12 Id. at 83–84. 
 13 Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act:  Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 
21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383, 384 (2003). 
 14 Enacted in 1981, the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act encour-
aged military agencies to supply intelligence, equipment, and training to civilian police 
departments.  Pub. L. No. 97–86 § 905, 95 Stat. 1115 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 371–82 (2012)).  In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress continued to expand the military’s 
ability to work directly with civilian law enforcement, through such legislation as the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act, which authorized and funded direct National Guard 
participation in drug operations.  See EVAN MUNSING & CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, JOINT 
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE—SOUTH:  THE BEST KNOWN, LEAST UNDERSTOOD INTERAGENCY 
SUCCESS 10–11, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES (2011); Kealy, supra note 
13, at 383. 
 15 Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 1 (1971) [hereinafter Federal 
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zations and people mentioned as surveillance targets in the Army 
documents initiated a suit challenging the constitutionality of these 
Army surveillance programs in February 1970.16  The plaintiffs, in-
cluding Arlo Tatum, then Executive Secretary of the General Com-
mittee for Conscientious Objectors, sought injunctive and declaratory 
relief from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and several high-
ranking Army officials.17  The defendants immediately filed motions 
to dismiss with the district court, refusing to discuss the specific Army 
intelligence activities, but assured the court of their legality, and 
claimed that the Laird plaintiffs had failed to state claims upon which 
relief could be granted.18 
In their complaint, the Laird plaintiffs did not assert that the Army 
had made any attempts to directly control protest or speech.  Instead, 
they argued that the Army’s domestic surveillance programs created 
with them an inhibiting force on First Amendment liberties.19  In-
deed, in his concurring opinion in Lamont v. Postmaster General, Jus-
tice William Brennan stated that the “inhibition as well as prohibition 
against the exercise of precious First Amendment rights is a power 
denied to government.”20  This was exactly what the Laird plaintiffs 
sought to challenge:  a nationwide domestic surveillance program, 
conducted by the Army, creates a “dragnet which may enmesh any-
one.”21 
District of Columbia District Court Judge George Hart, Jr. heard 
oral argument on the motions in April 1970.22  The plaintiffs had 
brought with them a number of former Army military intelligence 
agents who were prepared to testify on their behalf on the nature and 
scope of the Army’s civilian surveillance programs.23  Judge Hart, 
however, refused to allow the plaintiffs to present any witnesses, and 
concluded on the papers that the surveillance activity in question was 
 
Data Banks Hearings]; see also Lawrence M. Baskir, Reflections on the Senate Investigation of 
Army Surveillance, 49 IND. L.J. 618, 618–21 (1974) (discussing Senator Ervin’s inquiries). 
 16 Military Surveillance:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on 
the Judicary, 93rd Cong. 1, 79–82 (1974) [hereinafter Military Surveillance Hearings] (state-
ment of John H.F. Shattuck, National Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
 17 Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 948–49 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev’d, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Military 
Surveillance Hearings, supra note 16, at 79–82; Pyle, supra note 8, at 49, 54–55. 
 18 Laird, 444 F.2d at 948–49. 
 19 See Ralph Michael Stein, Laird v. Tatum:  The Supreme Court and a First Amendment Challenge 
to Military Surveillance of Lawful Civilian Political Activity, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 244, 246 
(1973). 
 20 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 309 (1965). 
 21 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937). 
 22 See Stein, supra note 19, at 247. 
 23 Id. 
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no more intrusive than collecting clippings of news media reports, 
which was constitutional.24  Judge Hart granted the Army’s motion to 
dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had not alleged any unconstitu-
tional conduct on the part of defendants.25 
The Laird plaintiffs appealed this ruling, and the D.C. Court of 
Appeals remanded the case back to the District Court for an eviden-
tiary hearing, finding that “[b]ecause the evil alleged in the Army in-
telligence system is that of overbreadth . . . and because there is no 
indication that a better opportunity will later arise to test the consti-
tutionality of the Army’s action, the issue can be considered justicia-
ble at this time.”26  The court further stated that “[t]he compilation of 
data by a civilian investigation agency is thus not the threat to civil 
liberties or the deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right of 
free speech that such action by the military is,” and ordered the Dis-
trict Court to re-hear the case.27 
The defendants appealed the order of the Court of Appeals to the 
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on the issues of justiciability 
and standing.28  The plaintiffs asked the Court to affirm the Court of 
Appeals order for an evidentiary hearing, arguing that the record as 
it existed was not sufficient for a determination of the constitutional 
issues before the District Court.  In addition to the parties’ briefs, a 
group of twenty-nine former military intelligence officers and agents 
filed an amicus brief with the Court.29  In their brief, the amici in-
formed the Court that the Army’s domestic surveillance programs 
went far beyond mere newspaper article clippings, and included such 
activities as widespread agent infiltration into civilian groups, agents 
posing as journalists with falsified identification, and assigning agents 
to stake out Martin Luther King, Jr.’s gravesite and keep records of 
visitors.30 
In June 1972, Chief Justice Warren Burger issued the majority (5-
4) opinion of the Court, reversing the Court of Appeals order, and 
thus affirming the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action.31  
The Court agreed with the defendants’ claim that their surveillance 
programs were put into place in the anticipation of civil disorder, 
 
 24 Id. at 247–48. 
 25 Laird, 444 F.2d at 948–49, 962–63; Stein, supra note 19, at 248. 
 26 Laird, 444 F.2d at 955–56. 
 27 Id. at 957. 
 28 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3 (1972). 
 29 See Stein, supra note 19, at 250 (discussing the amicus brief). 
 30 Id. at 250–51. 
 31 Laird, 408 U.S. at 2–3. 
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with no actual or threatened injury by these programs.  More relevant 
to this Essay, however, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not have 
standing to sue, stating that 
[The plaintiffs’] approach would have the federal courts as virtually con-
tinuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action; such 
a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its committees and 
the ‘power of the purse’; it is not the role for the judiciary, absent actual 
present or immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful gov-
ernmental action.32 
This opinion was a dramatic departure from First Amendment 
precedent, where courts had created a standard of justiciability in 
First Amendment cases that was less restrictive than in cases where 
constitutional rights were not at stake.  For example, in Reed Enterpris-
es v. Corcoran, the court held that “[w]here the plaintiff complains of 
chills and threats in the protected First Amendment area, a court is 
more disposed to find that he is presenting a real and not an abstract 
controversy.”33  In Dombrowski v. Pfister, the Supreme Court held that 
First Amendment rights were “of transcendent value to all society, 
and not merely to those exercising their rights,” noting that 
“[b]ecause of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected ex-
pression, we have not required that all those subject to overbroad 
regulations risk prosecution to test their rights.”34  It is also notewor-
thy that, prior to Laird, the Supreme Court had flatly rejected a “bal-
ancing test” between constitutionally protected expression and na-
tional security: 
Faced with a clear conflict between a federal statute enacted in the inter-
ests of national security and an individual’s exercise of his First Amend-
ment rights, we have confined our analysis to whether Congress has 
adopted a constitutional means in achieving its concededly legitimate 
legislative goal. . . . [W]e have in no way “balanced” those respective in-
terests.  We have ruled only that the Constitution requires that the con-
flict between congressional power and individual rights be accommodat-
ed by legislation drawn more narrowly to avoid the conflict.35 
In his dissent in Laird, Justice William Douglas observed that the 
majority’s conclusory opinion was “too transparent for serious argu-
ment,” and stated “[o]ne need not wait to sue until he loses his job or 
until his reputation is defamed.  To withhold standing to sue until 
that time arrives would in practical effect immunize from judicial 
scrutiny all surveillance activities, regardless of their misuse and their 
 
 32 Id. at 15. 
 33 Reed Enters. v. Corcoran, 354 F.2d 519, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 34 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
 35 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967). 
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deterrent effect.”36  In a separate dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justices Potter Stewart and John Marshall, strongly disagreed with the 
majority’s denial of standing, stating “[r]espondents may or may not 
be able to prove the case they allege.  But I agree with the Court of 
Appeals that they are entitled to try.”37 
III.  JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND RECUSAL 
In addition to the flawed reasoning by the majority in Laird re-
garding standing and justiciability in First Amendment cases, a seri-
ous impartiality question was raised by then-Justice William 
Rehnquist’s participation in the majority opinion.  Prior to his 1972 
appointment to the Supreme Court, Rehnquist was an Assistant At-
torney General in the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Coun-
sel (“OLC”).38  While he was with the OLC, Rehnquist appeared be-
fore Senator Ervin’s 1971 hearings on the very subject matter raised 
in Laird.39  During these hearings, Rehnquist testified as to the legality 
of the military domestic surveillance programs, and directly opined 
on the Laird case, then before the D.C. Court of Appeals: 
My only point of disagreement with [Senator Ervin] is to say whether as 
in the case of Tatum v. Laird that has been pending in the Court of Ap-
peals here in the District of Columbia that an action will lie by private cit-
izens to enjoin the gathering of information by the executive branch 
where there has been no threat of compulsory process and no pending 
action against any of those individuals on the part of the Government.40 
The opinion given by then-Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist 
bears a striking similarity to the conclusion later reached by the Laird 
Court:  chilling effects alone do not warrant standing. 
The Laird plaintiffs sought the recusal of Justice Rehnquist based 
on the clear appearance of bias, citing the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
which states, in part, that “[a] judge should perform the duties of his 
office impartially and diligently,” and “should disqualify himself in a 
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, 
 
 36 Laird, 408 U.S. at 24, 26 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 37 Id. at 40 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 38 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 592 (1987) 
(describing Justice Rehnquist’s role as head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel to the White House). 
 39 See id. (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s testimony before the Senate Committee); Military 
Surveillance Hearings, supra note 16, at 90 n.3 (explaining that Justice Rehnquist’s decision 
in Laird was controversial due to his testimony before the Senate Committee); Federal Data 
Banks Hearings, supra note 15, at 597 (providing Justice Rehnquist’s testimony before the 
Senate committee). 
 40 Federal Data Banks Hearings, supra note 15, at 864–65. 
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including but not limited to instances where . . . he has a personal bi-
as or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disput-
ed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.”41  In October 1972, 
Justice Rehnquist issued an unprecedented sixteen-page memoran-
dum where he denied the motion for recusal, acknowledging that 
“fair minded judges might disagree” about this matter.42 Justice 
Rehnquist further noted that his recusal could result in “the principle 
of law presented by the case [remaining] unsettled.”43  This last point 
was clearly erroneous, however, as a divided Court in Laird would on-
ly ensure an evidentiary hearing at the District Court level, which 
would make a record for later review, possibly by the Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION:  LAIRD’S LEGACY 
Our courts have long operated under the assumption that the 
Constitution requires that conflicts between legislative power and in-
dividual rights can only be accommodated by legislation that is drawn 
more narrowly so as to avoid that conflict—it is government that must 
adjust to the Constitution, not the other way around.  As Chief Justice 
John Marshall observed in McCulloch v. Maryland, “[l]et the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.”44  The Laird Court failed to live up to 
this standard when it refused to grant Article III standing to citizens 
who sought to show that the Army’s domestic surveillance programs 
did not conform with the Constitution.  This seriously flawed opinion 
has become the basis for similar denials of standing for those seeking 
to challenge government surveillance programs.  As Justice Douglas 
observed in his Laird dissent, “[t]his case involves a cancer in our 
body politic.”45 
It didn’t take long for courts to embrace Laird as a useful tool to 
dismiss cases where plaintiffs sought to challenge government surveil-
lance programs, especially where the complaints rested on a First 
Amendment chill from political profiling by law enforcement.  Some 
judges took exception to a broad interpretation of Laird, but objec-
 
 41 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES CANON 3, 3(C)(1) (1972). 
 42 See Note, Justice Rehnquist’s Decision to Participate in Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 106, 
121 (1973) (quoting Justice Renquist’s justification for denying the motion). 
 43 Id. at 123 (quoting Justice Rehnquist). 
 44 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). 
 45 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 28 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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tions largely showed up in dissenting opinions.  For the most part, 
early interpretations of Laird sympathized with the government’s view 
of surveillance claims. 
For example, about a month after the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision denying Article III standing to the plaintiffs in 
Laird, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit cited 
the decision in a case involving the open surveillance of demonstra-
tions and meetings by the Richmond, Virginia police, which included 
the photographing of participants for the purposes of establishing 
and maintaining police files, which were then shared with other law 
enforcement agencies.46  The plaintiffs in Donohoe objected to the po-
lice surveillance, arguing that the presence of police officers and use 
of police photographers violated their First Amendment rights by in-
hibiting their ability to freely speak and associate.47  The Richmond 
police argued that they had a duty to “know who the leaders (of the 
demonstrations) are” in order to determine whether any demonstra-
tors were “dangerous.”48  The police further pointed out that they on-
ly attended meetings held on public streets and spaces, and did not 
attend a series of protest meetings held at a local church (although 
they did park a police car outside the church to take photographs of 
everyone entering and leaving the meeting).49 
The Donohoe plaintiffs asserted that, despite (and because of) the 
fact that the Richmond police were conducting their surveillance in 
the open, participation in these demonstrations and meetings was 
chilled.50  The court, however, disagreed, observing that the plaintiffs 
made no claims that could provide a basis for standing, and stated 
that just because the police presence and photography made the par-
ticipants “nervous” or “felt uncomfortable” was not enough to estab-
lish any First Amendment harms under Laird.51  The court also dis-
missed the testimony of a meeting attendee who stated that the FBI 
told his employer that he had participated in a demonstration, stating 
that “[i]t is common knowledge . . . that the FBI maintains its own 
surveillance of demonstration groups” and there was “no evidence 
that the FBI had actually secured this information from the Rich-
mond police department.”52  The Donohoe court cited Laird, holding 
 
 46 See generally Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 47 Id. at 197. 
 48 Id. at 198. 
 49 Id. at 198–99. 
 50 Id. at 199. 
 51 Id. at 199–200. 
 52 Id. at 200. 
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that standing cannot arise “‘merely from the individual’s knowledge 
that a governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from 
the individual’s concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those 
activities, the agency might in the future take some other and addi-
tional action detrimental to that individual.’”53  To put it plainly, “al-
legations of a subjective ‘chill’” from the presence of government 
agents photographing meeting participants for inclusion in police 
files “will not suffice.”54 
Not every judge agreed with this interpretation.  In Fifth Avenue 
Peace Parade Committee v. Gray, Judge James Oakes dissented from the 
majority opinion following Laird, observing in rather understated 
tones that “[t]here has been detected a tendency in recent times to 
justify invasion of constitutional rights on the basis of national securi-
ty.”55  These rights, which include the “right . . . peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievanc-
es . . . necessarily implied a right to freedom in political 
associations.”56  Judge Oakes articulated the premise that 
a group, even a huge group, of people who want to go to the seat of gov-
ernment to protest a war and who do so peaceably have the right not to 
have their name (and hence their views against the administration or the 
Congress or the courts or the policies of any in relation to the war) listed 
in some dossier or table or catalog of protesters and disseminated 
throughout all the major branches of the ‘security system’ of the United 
States.57 
Judge Oakes distinguished Laird on the basis that the Supreme 
Court’s decision should be “‘narrow[ly]’ limited to general surveil-
lance without specific misuse of data.”58 
That is to say, the Laird majority, in Judge Oakes’s words, “serious-
ly underestimated the size and scope of [government] intelligence 
activities which included gathering public and private information on 
hundreds of thousands of ‘politically suspect’ persons,” and might 
have decided differently had they the benefit of Senator Ervin’s hear-
ings and “Watergate-allied events” at the time of their decision.59  One 
could make an argument that the Burger Court would not have de-
cided differently in Laird, even if the caustic repercussions of 
 
 53 Id. at 201 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Laird, 408 U.S. at 11). 
 54 Id. at 202. 
 55 480 F.2d 326, 333 (1973) (Oakes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 56 Id. at 334. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 336. 
 59 Id. at 336–37. 
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COINTELPRO,60 Watergate, and the many post-Cold War govern-
ment intelligence abuses were made public at the time.  But perhaps, 
in a post-Snowden world where issues of government surveillance are 
perhaps even more pressing than in the days of Laird, we should be 
asking these same questions of the Roberts Court. 
 
 
 60 COINTELPRO was the FBI’s acronym for their large-scale, secret Counterintelligence 
Program, which used techniques originally approved for use against foreign enemies and 
applied them against domestic political groups.  The program was started by FBI Director 
J. Edgar Hoover in 1956 and originally targeted the Communist Party, with the intent to 
“disrupt” or “neutralize” organizations and individuals.  COINTELPRO quickly expanded 
to include any individual or group Hoover considered to be “subversive,” leading the 
Church Committee to later observe that the program “demonstrates the dangers inherent 
in the overbroad collection of domestic intelligence.”  SETH ROSENFELD, SUBVERSIVES:  
THE FBI’S WAR ON STUDENT RADICALS, AND REAGAN’S RISE TO POWER 16, 213–14 (2012). 
